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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of the financial crisis on credit supply by using highly 
detailed data on bank-firm relationships in Italy after Lehman’s collapse. We control for 
firms’ unobservable characteristics, such as credit demand and borrowers’ risk, by exploiting 
multiple lending. We find evidence of a contraction of credit supply, associated to low bank 
capitalization and scarce liquidity. The ability of borrowers to compensate through 
substitution across banks appears to have been limited. We also document that larger less-
capitalized banks reallocated loans away from riskier firms, contributing to credit pro-
cyclicality. Such ‘flight to quality’ has not occurred for smaller less-capitalized banks. We 
argue that this may have reflected, among other things, evergreening practices. We provide 
corroborating evidence based on data on borrowers' productivity and interest rates at bank-
firm level. 
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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations.    1 Introduction1
Since the start of the recent ￿nancial crisis there has been an intense debate
on whether banks had become abnormally reluctant to grant loans to the
economy, particularly to ￿rms. The debate has attracted not only economists
but politicians and the public opinion at large, for its important implications.
A contraction of credit supply can be particularly harmful during a period
of weak economic activity as ￿rms￿liquidity bu⁄ers are low and a dramatic
cutback in their investment spending may exacerbate the dampening e⁄ects
of the recession on production and employment.
One important factor which may lead to a contraction in credit supply is
related to the di¢ culties that banks encounter on the liability side of their
balance sheet and, in particular, in maintaining an adequate level of capital,
be it connected with prudential regulation or market discipline. Worries
intensi￿ed after the collapse of Lehman Brothers when credit growth fell
dramatically in all developed economies.
However, despite the intense debate and the massive interventions by pub-
lic authorities, conclusive evidence of a capital-related contraction of credit
supply is still unavailable.2 In particular, the need of controlling e⁄ectively
for developments in credit demand makes the identi￿cation of changes in
credit supply quite di¢ cult (e.g., Udell, 2009).
An additional subtlety is that credit supply, or more generally banks￿
willingness to lend to a given ￿rm, may diminish because of an increase in
perceived risk and for other good reasons. Basic corporate ￿nance princi-
ples suggest that some rationing in ￿nancial markets arises as a second best
device to face incentive issues: as entrepreneurs should maintain a su¢ cient
stake on ￿rm￿ s return, their debt capacity is limited by their own resources.
1The views in this paper are those of the authors only and do not necessarily re￿ ect
those of the Bank of Italy. Helpful comments were received from Paolo Angelini, Matteo
Bugamelli, Riccardo De Bonis, Eugenio Gaiotti, Simon Gilchrist, Luigi Guiso, Giorgio
Gobbi, Francesca Lotti, Paolo Mistrulli, Fabio Panetta, Diego Rodriguez de la Palenzuela,
Carmelo Salleo, Fabiano Schivardi, Alessandro Secchi, Enrico Sette and seminar partici-
pants at Bank of Italy, EIEF, University of Bologna, the 2009 NBER Summer Institute,
the 2009 CEPR-Bank of Finland-Cass Business School conference on ￿Credit crunch and
the macroeconomy￿and the 2010 CEPR-University of Tilburg conference on ￿Procycli-
cality and ￿nancial regulation￿ . Responsability for any error is entirely our own. E-mail:
ugo.albertazzi@bancaditalia.it; domenico.marchetti@bancaditalia.it.
2At an earlier stage of the crisis, when credit growth was decreasing but still robust,
some disputed the existence of a credit supply restriction at all (Chari et al., 2008).
5Disentangling these sources of supply contraction from that associated to
capital constraints is di¢ cult, as all typically get exacerbated during crises.
Previous studies have tried to overcome these di¢ culties in several ways
but, due to data limitation, could not properly control for loan demand.
Peek and Rosengren (1995), using US bank-level data, document a stronger
contraction of credit by less-capitalized banks during the 1990-91 recession.
Although highly suggestive, this evidence is not fully persuasive given that
di⁄erences in bank capital are likely to be associated with di⁄erences in
borrowers quality, so that di⁄erences in credit growth may just re￿ ect di⁄er-
ences in ￿rms￿conditions rather than in banks￿conditions. More structural
evidence with bank-level data is supplied by Peek and Rosengren (2000),
who show that losses in Japan prompted US subsidiaries of Japanese banks
to cut back credit in US. Woo (2003), based on Japanese data, documents a
stronger contraction of credit by less-capitalized banks in 1997, when govern-
ment and regulator￿ s indulgence towards banks ceased. A similar approach,
based on information on loan rejection rates over the current ￿nancial crisis,
is followed by Puri, Rocholl and Ste⁄en (2009), who ￿nd that German sav-
ing banks a¢ liated with Landesbanken heavily exposed to subprime lending
reduced acceptance rates by more than other saving banks.3
In this work we provide robust evidence of a capital-related contraction of
credit supply, by using highly detailed data on bank-￿rm relationships after
Lehman￿ s collapse, based on a representative sample of Italian ￿rms. The
main feature of our empirical analysis is that we control for ￿rm￿ s speci￿c
risk and credit demand by exploiting the widespread use in Italy of multi-
ple lenders (Detragiache et al., 2000), which allows us to use ￿xed e⁄ects
capturing all unobservable ￿rm￿ s characteristics.4;5 The period analyzed is
3Other papers try to exploit ￿rm or sectoral level data, but cannot distinguish ￿ pure￿
from other supply factors. Dell￿ Ariccia et al. (2008) identify loan supply factors by exploit-
ing sectoral di⁄erences in dependence on the banking sector; Borensztein and Lee (2002)
have used information at the ￿rm-level and proxied credit demand with some observ-
able balance sheet items (e.g., net investment and cash-￿ ow). Perhaps most convincingly,
JimØnez et al. (2009) go one step further by analyzing individual bank-￿rm relationships
in Spain until December 2008; they show that, responding to the same borrower￿ s loan
application, undercapitalized banks were more likely to reject it.
4Note that this is di⁄erent from having ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects in a standard panel
set-up with repeated cross sections, since in that environment ￿xed e⁄ects would capture
all time invariant unobservable features which clearly cannot include (time varying) credit
demand.
5Unlike JimØnez et al. (2009), who also consider individual bank-￿rm relationships, we
6the six-month period after Lehman￿ s failure (September 2008-March 2009),
when the ￿nancial crisis erupted and credit growth collapsed dramatically
everywhere (in Italy the 3-month growth of credit to ￿rms fell from 8% to
1%, on a annualized basis; the dynamics of loans has stagnated since then,
in Italy as in the rest of the Euro area and the other major economies; see
Figure 1). This is also when, according to evidence based on bank survey
data, credit supply e⁄ects were more pronounced.6
In the investigation of the restrictions to credit supply, Italy is an inter-
esting case to study for two main reasons. It is a bank-based economy so
that distortions in credit supply may possibly bring a sizable impact;7 more
generally, because of common economic and banking features, the analysis
of credit developments in Italy can help to shed light on developments in
continental Europe at large. Moreover, because of the data requirements of
banking supervision, a unique dataset is available for the Italian economy,
which includes timely information on outstanding loans at bank-￿rm level.
We also investigate if the capital-related contraction of credit supply had
a diversi￿ed impact across ￿rms, in particular according to borrower￿ s risk.
There are several reasons why it may be so. For instance, the higher risk-
sensitiveness of Basle II capital requirements may induce a bias toward less
risky borrowers. Other mechanisms, such as evergreening, may work in the
opposite direction. According to the latter notion (dubbed also forbearance
lending, unnatural selection or zombie lending), less-capitalized banks may
delay the recognition of losses on their credit portfolio by rolling over loans
to high-risk borrowers, in order not to further impair their reported capital
and pro￿tability (Peek and Rosengren, 2005).
Unnatural selection in credit allocation has been largely documented with
regard to the long-lasting Japanese stagnation of the nineties, to which it
contributed in several ways (Caballero et al., 2008). Several observers have
emphasized the similarities with the current ￿nancial crisis (e.g., Hoshi and
look at credit dynamics rather than loan rejections. There are many reasons why loan
rejection rates may not merely re￿ ect lending policies. For instance, if there is a cost
associated to the decision to apply for a loan, then the expectation of a tighter (looser)
lending policy may discourage (encourage) applicants (one obvious cost is related to the
possibility that a bank may get some information on previous rejections by the other
lenders, as it happens in Italy).
6See Del Giovane et al. (2010).
7At the end of 2008, the ratio of total bank credit to nominal GDP amounted to 60%
in US, compared to 112% in Italy (140 in the euro area as a whole, higher than in Italy
mainly because of the low level of Italian households￿indebtedness).
7Kashyap, 2008; Kobayashi, 2008). It is therefore natural to ask if those
credit market ine¢ ciencies could take place in other economies beyond the
Japanese one. Indeed, the introduction in 2008 of Basle II standards, with
their more procyclical capital requirements, may have contributed world-wide
to the increasing di¢ culties faced by troubled banks to maintain an adequate
capitalization.8
We ￿nd substantial di⁄erences across lenders in the nexus between poor
bank capitalization and the attitude towards borrower￿ s risk. In particu-
lar, we show that larger less-capitalized banks reallocated loans away from
riskier borrowers. Such ￿ ￿ ight to quality￿has not occurred for smaller less-
capitalized banks. This ￿nding is consistent with evergreening but also with
other explanations (for example, with smaller banks being less a⁄ected by
Basle II risk-sensitive capital requirements). We provide evidence suggestive
that evergreening did play a role by using data on borrowers￿productivity
and interest rates at bank-￿rm level.
Our contribution to the literature is three-fold. We provide robust evi-
dence of a capital-related contraction of credit supply. As to evergreening,
our analysis represents the ￿rst attempt to our knowledge to study this is-
sue beyond the case of Japan. Furthermore, this paper improves in the way
impaired borrowers are identi￿ed. While previous contributions have mainly
focused on balance sheet indicators of borrowers￿quality, we consider also
information on ￿rm￿ s economic fundamentals and competitiveness (based on
TFP measures). Crucially, this allows us to disentangle short-termist lend-
ing patterns such as evergreening from the opposite phenomenon of ￿ patience￿
(namely the extension of credit to economically sound ￿rms which undergo
temporary ￿nancial di¢ culties and appear risky). Altogether, we show that
an excessive generalized credit tightening and the extension of ￿ cheap￿credit
to selected (risky) borrowers, both induced by low bank capitalization, may
well coexist.9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
presents a simple model where capital constraints are introduced into a stan-
dard model of borrowing capacity. Section 3 describes the data. Section
4 presents the main evidence of bank capital e⁄ects on credit supply. Sec-
tion 5 analyzes the heterogeneity of credit supply restrictions across ￿rms
8See e.g. Panetta et al. (2009).
9It has been already shown for transition economies that credit supply restriction and
soft budget constraint are not mutually exclusive (Bergl￿f and Roland, 1997).
8and banks, in particular with respect to the borrower￿ s risk. Section 6 in-
vestigates the role of relationship lending. Finally, Section 7 draws some
conclusions.
2 The Analytical Framework
In this section we slightly extend a basic corporate ￿nance model of borrowing
capacity in order to illustrate the theoretical underpinnings of our empirical
analysis. We show how our estimations can identify two interrelated but
distinct mechanisms, namely a capital-related contraction of credit supply
and e¢ cient credit rationing.
Let￿ s consider an economy populated by N entrepreneurs, indexed by i,
each endowed with a risky investment project. The expected return depends
on the behavior of the entrepreneur which is not contractable. The invest-
ment is pro￿table only if the entrepreneur behaves correctly (for example by
exerting adequate e⁄ort); should he misbehave, he would enjoy some private
bene￿ts. Each entrepreneur is endowed with an amount of cash (or equity)
equal to Ai.10
If the total investment required by the project, Ii, is larger than Ai, the
entrepreneur can borrow the di⁄erence (Ii ￿ Ai) from a bank.
As the behavior of the entrepreneur cannot be determined by contractual
provisions, he will choose an adequate level of e⁄ort in equilibrium only if it
is convenient for him to do so (in other words, if the incentive compatibility
constraint is satis￿ed). A standard result is that, for this to be the case,
the borrower should keep a su¢ cient stake in the investment￿ s returns; more
precisely, under quite general conditions it can be shown that there exists a







i is the optimal level of investment (the ￿rst-best solution, where
all agency frictions are ruled out by assumption). With some approximation,
I￿
i can be thought of as loan demand.
The intuition is that, whenever I￿
i >Aiki, there is some rationing (I￿
i ￿ Aiki),
and its extent is related to the severity of the agency costs (ki is a decreasing
10More generally, Ai can be interepreted as a measure of balance sheet conditions; a
high Ai characterizes a ￿rm with a relatively small debt or relatively high levels of cash,
equity or ￿xed capital which can be used as collateral.
9function of the private bene￿ts that the entrepreneur enjoys by misbehav-
ing).11
Let￿ s consider now the presence of a (binding) capital constraint. Ex-
cluding by assumption the uninteresting case where I￿
i < Ai, the capital
constraint can be written as:
N X
i=1
(Ii ￿ Ai) ￿ ￿C (2)
where C, bank capital, and ￿ are positive and exogenously given (the left
hand side is total lending by the bank). This constraint may be interpreted
as representing either the prudential capital regulation (￿ = 1=0:08) or more
generally the market discipline which limits the bank￿ s access to ￿nancial
markets (for the same reasons outlined above for a generic ￿rm). The solu-
tion is readily obtained by assuming so called-type I rationing, namely that
lending to each individual borrower is reduced proportionally to the level
such that constraint (2) is satis￿ed with an equality.12 With this simplify-
ing hypothesis, lending to ￿rm i, denoted as L00
i to distinguish it from the
unconstrained level L0











i. Two remarks are in order. First, since L00
i < L0
i,
total rationing imposed on a ￿rm is larger when capital constraints are bind-
ing. This additional source of rationing is exactly what the empirical analysis
reported in Section 5 is aimed at measuring. The welfare implications of the
two types of rationing are quite di⁄erent. If banks granted more credit than
L0
i, they would determine a misalignment of ￿rms￿incentives; on the con-
trary, if banks granted more credit than L00
i then ￿rm￿ s incentives would still
be preserved.
One di¢ culty in isolating the two sources of rationing is that they are
likely to move together: when business activity slows down, ￿rms are likely
to undergo an erosion of equity and possibly face harsher agency frictions,
implying a lower L0
i; similarly, the rationing brought by the erosion of bank
equity is likely to raise during recessions, when banks tend to su⁄er higher
credit losses.
11For more details on the notion of equity multiplier see, for example, Tirole (2006).
12The opposite case of type II rationing ￿ i.e., some borrowers within a homogeneous
group receive credit while others do not ￿ is discussed below.
10The rationale of our empirical strategy is suggested by the simple com-
parison of the two solutions L0
i and L00
i. With no shortage of bank capital,
lending to a given ￿rm just re￿ ects its characteristics, such as its equity Ai
and agency costs ki. In the alternative case where ￿C <
PN
i=1 Ai (ki ￿ 1),
lending to a ￿rm is also in￿ uenced by lender￿ s characteristics, in particular
its capitalization C. Taking logs of (3) leads to the regression equation:
ln(Li;j) = ￿0 + ￿1 ln(Ai (ki ￿ 1)) + ￿2 ln(Cj) + "i;j (4)




i=1;:::;N Ai (ki ￿ 1)
￿￿
and "i;j is an error term. The
notation Li;j stands for loans extended to ￿rm i by bank j. The null hypoth-
esis of no (capital-related) credit supply restrictions is H0 : ￿2 = 0, against
the alternative H1 : ￿2 > 0.
By introducing the index j for banks we implicitly dropped the assump-
tion of the existence of a unique bank; this is done not only for the sake of
realism, but also for introducing an important methodological feature of our
analysis. In principle, estimating (4) requires detailed information not just
on balance sheet items Ai but also on variables, such as the agency costs
ki, which are hardly observable. Notwithstanding, supposing that there is
availability of information on loan dynamics at bank-￿rm level, an unbiased
estimation of the coe¢ cient ￿2 can be obtained by using standard panel data
techniques.
The model assumption of bank capital exogeneity needs some clari￿ca-
tion. Banks do actively adjust their own capital endowment, presumably by
also taking into account current and expected loan demand. However, as
documented by the empirical literature, the adjustment of bank capital is
not necessarily frictionless (indeed, our test of capital-related restriction of
credit supply can be seen as a test of capital exogeneity).13 Broadly speaking,
the ability to raise (outside) equity capital is in￿ uenced by factors similar to
those a⁄ecting the ability to raise debt capital, for both non ￿nancial ￿rms
and banks.14
Finally, it is worth mentioning that there are two potential aspects of a
13Barakova and Carey (2001) show that it takes 1.6 years for banks to restore their
capital after becoming under-capitalized. The adjustment is possibly even slower according
to Barnea and Kim (2008).
14More speci￿cally, Kashyap and Stein (2004) emphasize that (i) equity issues increase
the value of existing debt, thus generating an externality in favor of debtholders and
harming existing shareholders; (ii) equity issues may signal forthcoming losses.
11capital-related contraction of credit supply which are neglected in the above
model but will be investigated in the empirical section. One is the possibility
that a ￿rm which is rationed by a bank with shortage of capital can compen-
sate by borrowing more from another bank which has an excess of capital.
The aggregate e⁄ect on credit supply of a shortage of bank capital is thus
a⁄ected by the ability of ￿rms to substitute across lenders. A second aspect
is the possible heterogeneity across ￿rms in the impact of credit supply re-
strictions. This heterogeneity may arise for several reasons. First, depending
on ￿rms￿production technology, it could be less costly to sacri￿ce only some
borrowers instead of reducing somewhat the credit to all. Also, banks￿lend-
ing decisions may be a⁄ected by the presence of long-lasting relationships.
Third, banks subject to risk-sensitive capital requirements, as with Basel II,
might decide to reallocate their loan portfolio towards less risky borrowers
in order to save on scarce capital. Moreover, quite to the opposite direction,
bankers may protect riskier borrowers in order to postpone the accounting
of credit losses (evergreening). In Section 5 we will investigate the hetero-




We use data on outstanding loans extended by Italian banks to a representa-
tive sample of Italian ￿rms in manufacturing and services, merged with data
on corresponding bank and ￿rm variables. The data on credit ￿ ows refer
to the period September 2008-March 2009; the data on bank variables refer
to September 2008, those on ￿rm characteristics to 2007 averages. Overall,
the dataset includes roughly 19,000 observations on bank-￿rm relationships,
which refer to outstanding loans extended by roughly 500 banks to almost
2,500 non-￿nancial ￿rms (on average, therefore, ￿rms in our sample borrow
from 8 di⁄erent banks).
Our dependent variable is the change in outstanding loans extended by
bank b to ￿rm i, divided by the ￿rm￿ s total assets at the beginning of the
period. We preferred to use this variable rather than the rate of growth
of loans because in many cases the amount of credit at bank-￿rm level at
the beginning of the period (September 2008) or at the end (March 2009)
12was negligible, resulting in a disproportionate number of observations with,
respectively, a huge positive rate of growth or a rate of growth equal to -100%
(see Table 1, ￿rst row).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of dependent variable (percent)
Variable (bank-￿rm level) Percentiles
1st 10th 25th median 75th 90th 99th
Rate of growth of credit -100 -100 -63.6 -10.9 16.4 117.5 23,039
Change of credit over ￿rm￿ s assets -11.6 -2.6 -0.7 0.0 .5 2.6 12.4
Rather than dropping large tails of the distribution of such dependent
variable, which in all likelihood would have resulted in the elimination of
observations with the most interesting information content for our purposes,
we chose to divide the change in credit by ￿rm￿ s total assets. This normal-
ization should not alter the information content of the data, while delivering
a variable with a much smoother distribution (see Table 1, second row). This
is therefore the main dependent variable that we use throughout this paper
(however, regressions with the rate of growth as dependent variable were also
run, for the sake of robustness; see Tables A3 and A8 in Appendix II).
The risk of ￿rm￿ s default is measured by Zscore, an indicator of the proba-
bility of default of a given ￿rm, which is computed annually by the Company
Accounts Data Service (CADS) on balance sheet variables (the methodology
is described by Altman, 1968, and Altman et al., 1994). It takes values from
1 to 9. Firms with Zscore value between 1 and 3 are considered ￿ low risk￿
by CADS, those in the 4-6 range are considered ￿ medium risk￿ , and those in
the 7-9 range are considered ￿ high risk￿ ; the latter ￿rms are more likely to
default within the next two years.
Productivity is computed for each ￿rm as the log-level of (gross output)
Solow Residual, tfpi:
tfpi = lnyi ￿ (￿L ￿ ln_li + ￿K ￿ ln_ki + ￿M ￿ ln_mi) , (5)
where ln_yi, ln_li; ln_ki and ln_mi are the logarithms of, respectively,
￿rm￿ s gross output, hours, capital and intermediate inputs, all measured in
real terms, and the ￿￿ s are the revenue shares of each input.15 Since the level
15Gross-output measures of total factor productivity, whenever data are available, are
preferable to value-added measures, because of the reduced-form nature of the latter,
13of productivity may vary widely across sectors, we computed for each ￿rm
its di⁄erence relative to the sectoral median, to allow for comparison across
sectors.
Further details on the de￿nition of variables and descriptive statistics can
be found in Appendix I.
3.2 Data sources
There are four main sources of data: data on outstanding loans come from
the Credit Register; balance-sheet data on bank variables are drawn from the
Banking Supervision Register at the Bank of Italy; data on ￿rms￿inputs and
output (used to measure productivity) and other ￿rm characteristics come
from the Bank of Italy annual Survey of Industrial and Service Firms and
from the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS).
The Credit Register data are collected by a special unit of the Bank of
Italy (Centrale dei Rischi) and contain detailed information on virtually all
individual loans extended in Italy (see Appendix I).
The Survey of Industrial and Service Firms (SISF) is carried out annually
by the Bank of Italy. The data are of very high quality, being collected
by o¢ cials of the local branches of the Bank of Italy, who often have a
long-standing work relationship with the ￿rm￿ s management. The Company
Accounts Data Service (CADS - Centrale dei Bilanci) is the most important
source of balance sheet data on Italian ￿rms. It covers about 30,000 ￿rms
and is compiled by a consortium that includes the Bank of Italy and all major
Italian commercial banks.
4 Evidence of capital-related contraction of
credit supply
4.1 The main results
The core of this paper is the investigation of bank-￿rm relationships over the
period September 2008-March 2009. This period coincides with the after-
math of Lehman￿ s bankruptcy, when the growth of credit came to a substan-
which may induce potential model misspeci￿cation and omitted variable bias when used
in regressions (see Basu and Fernald, 1997; for an analysis of these TFP measures with a
dataset similar to that used in this work, see Marchetti and Nucci, 2006).
14tial halt (for the median ￿rm in our sample, outstanding loans contracted in
nominal terms by an annualized 1.6%).
Consistently with the model introduced in Section 2, the basic regression
for testing the hypothesis of a capital-related contraction of credit supply is
the following:
￿credb;i = ￿ + ￿1 ￿ low_capb + ￿i + ub;i (6)
where ￿credb;i is the change in outstanding loans extended by bank b to
￿rm i between (end) September 2008 and (end) March 2009, divided by
￿rm i￿ s total assets in September 2008; low_capb is a dummy variable for
less-capitalized banks; ￿i is a ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed-e⁄ect and ub;i is the regres-
sion residual. More precisely, low_capb is equal to 1 for banks whose total
(risk-weighted) capital ratio is lower than 10%. The latter value is that
recommended by the Bank of Italy, and ￿ although the o¢ cial Basle II reg-
ulatory threshold is 8% ￿ it appears to be perceived by the market as the
relevant benchmark; moreover, it roughly coincides with the 25th percentile
(10.5%) of the sample distribution, and therefore is a useful reference value
also in statistical terms.16
Equation (6) includes ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed-e⁄ects; this key feature allows us
to control for ￿rm￿ s credit demand as well as any other ￿rm￿ s characteris-
tic. Regression results are reported in Table 2, ￿rst column. The estimated
coe¢ cient of low_capb is negative and highly signi￿cant, leading to a clear
rejection of the null hypothesis that a capital-related contraction of credit
supply did not occur. We also investigated the role of other balance sheet
indicators of banks￿funding di¢ culties ￿ beyond those associated to reg-
ulatory requirements ￿ such as the liquidity ratio. We thus included the
dummy variable high_liqb for banks whose liquidity ratio (i.e., cash and se-
curities other than shares, divided by total assets) is higher that the sample
median (12.1%). Results are reported in Table 2, second column. The sup-
ply of credit by more liquid banks has been signi￿cantly higher, while the
estimated coe¢ cient of low_capb remains negative and highly signi￿cant.
We also considered, mainly as controls, three variables related to di⁄erent
aspects of bank organization, possibly relevant during the crisis: largeb is a
dummy for banks belonging to the major ￿ve banking groups (which overall
extend roughly half of total loans to non-￿nancial ￿rms, and accounted for
16The use of a dummy for lowly-capitalized bank is aimed at capturing possible non-
linearities, since bank capital a⁄ects credit supply only when capital constraints are bind-
ing.
15most of the credit slowdown); scoring_bankb is a dummy, based on survey
data, which is equal to 1 for banks whose use of scoring schemes in lending
decisions is reported to be either ￿important￿or ￿very important￿ , and 0 for
banks that report to make little or no use of credit scoring; coopb is a dummy
variable for cooperative banks, which are subject to a speci￿c regulatory
regime and have been shown in the literature to focus on relationship lending
(e.g., Angelini et al., 1998).
Results of the extended model are reported in Table 2, third column. The
e⁄ect of bank capital and liquidity is strenghtened, despite the high signif-
icance of the estimated coe¢ cient for largeb.17 Overall, these results show
that the ￿ndings for low_capb previously commented are not due to possible
correlation between low bank capitalization and other banking features, such
as the fact of belonging to a major banking group or the reliance on credit
scores in lending decisions.18
The contraction of loan supply by less-capitalized banks has been signi￿-
cant in both statistical and economic terms. The (asset-normalized) change
in credit extended by less-capitalized banks is about two percentage points
lower (in annual terms) compared to that of other banks. It can be estimated
that, on an annual basis, this corresponds to roughly 0.7% of the stock of
outstanding loans to ￿rms (measured in September 2008); analogously, the
e⁄ect through liquidity constraints, captured by the coe¢ cient of high_liqb,
corresponds to roughly 0.6% of the stock. Overall, therefore, ￿ pure￿supply
e⁄ects related to banks￿balance-sheet conditions amounted to more than 1%
of total credit to ￿rms.
Our interpretation of the results is corroborated by looking at loan supply
developments in the pre-crisis period. In particular, for comparison purposes,
we considered the latest six-month period spanning from September to March
before the beginning of the turmoil (August 2007), that is September 2006-
March 2007, and estimated again the extended model with the corresponding
17This ￿nding, as we will see, is not speci￿c to the period under investigation and is
possibly related to the ongoing recomposition of market shares in the Italian credit market
following the consolidation process of the sector in ￿rst half of the 2000￿ s.
18The coe¢ cient of scoring_bankb is positive and signi￿cant, contrary to the common
conjecture that a heavy use of credit scores would weigh negatively on lending decisions
during a recession accompanied by a ￿nancial crisis. However, the procyclical implications
of credit scoring on loan developments deserve a deeper analysis, which is beyond the
scope of this paper. Similar considerations can be done with regard to the estimate of the
coe¢ cient of coopb, which is typically interpreted as a proxy of relationship lending.
16data. The results are reported in Table 2, fourth column: as expected, at
normal times the supply of credit is not a⁄ected by bank capitalization (or
liquidity, for that matter). Overall, the evidence reported for the pre-crisis
period strongly con￿rms the interpretation of our results as evidence of a
capital-related contraction of credit supply.
4.2 Robustness
The results proved extremely robust along several dimensions. First, they are
substantially unchanged if the original dependent variable is replaced by the
rate of growth of loans (Table A3 in Appendix II). Second, the results proved
robust to the choice of the threshold value for the de￿nition of low_capb
(low_capb was set equal to 1 for banks whose capital ratio is lower than the
sample median, i.e. 13.0; Table A4). A third set of robustness checks was
related to the de￿nition of credit: we considered granted rather than utilized
credit (Table A5).
A further robustness exercise was related to the level at which the capital
ratio is computed (individual banks vs. group). Regulatory requirements
concern both unconsolidated capital ratios and consolidated ones. Through-
out this paper we chose to use unconsolidated ratios, in order to exploit the
heterogeneity of behavior and conditions across banks belonging to the same
group. For example, the literature on internal capital markets shows that
agency frictions among individual ￿rms within industrial or banking groups
generates relationships which tend to be similar to those observed among
independent market participants (e.g., Shin and Stultz, 1998). Moreover,
consolidated balance sheet data are not available at quarterly frequency, so
that we should use capital ratios computed on either June or December 2008;
given that capital levels were changing during the period of interest, this
could bring noise in the data. At any rate, consolidated and unconsolidated
capital ratios exhibit an extremely high level of correlation in June 2008 (.87).
A ￿nal advantage, on statistical grounds, is the much greater variability and
granularity of unconsolidated capital ratios.19 This notwithstanding, for ro-
bustness purposes (for example, bank supervision activity tend to focus on
consolidated parameters), we regressed our dependent variable (computed
with consolidated loan data) on low_capb computed based on consolidated
19The banks of the ￿ve major groups (15% of our dataset) account for roughly 60%
of total bank-￿rm observations; over all those observations the consolidated capital ratio
spans across 5 di⁄erent values included in a very narrow range (9.1-10.4).
17capital ratios and the corresponding distribution. The estimated coe¢ cient
remains negative and highly signi￿cant (see Table A6).
A ￿nal robustness exercise was related to the accounting impact of securi-
tizations on loans data. The data on outstanding loans used throughout the
paper do not include securitized loans. In principle this seems appropriate
since typically a bank, by securitizing a loan, sells on the market the loan
itself, transfering on third parties the corresponding risk of credit. The loan
supply of that bank to the given ￿rm decreases by the corresponding amount.
However, in practice, in the period being considered most securitizations were
so-called retained-securitizations, whose only purpose was to create securities
to be used as collateral in the Eurosystem￿ s re￿nancing operations but which
did not imply any transfer of risk to third parties. In such cases the loan
supply at the bank-￿rm level can be considered unchanged. We therefore ad-
justed loan data for the e⁄ect of securitizations, by re-including loans which
were securitized during the period of interest into the stock of outstanding
bank-￿rm loans at the end of March 2009. The results are shown in Table
A7 and are virtually unchanged.
A full discussion of all robustness exercises is provided in Appendix II.
4.3 Substitution across banks
We also tried to investigate if and to what extent borrowers were able to
compensate the contraction of credit supplied by less-capitalized banks by
increasing loans from other banks. In principle, in the extreme case of perfect
and timely substitution the credit supply restrictions by capital-constrained
banks would have no e⁄ects on production and employment, and there would
be merely a recomposition of credit ￿ ows within the banking sector.
For each ￿rm in our dataset we thus computed the change of loans ex-
tended by all highly-capitalized banks (i.e., banks with capital ratio ￿ 10%)
and regressed it on the change of loans extended by all other banks (de￿ned
as cred_lowcapi). If substitution were perfect and this were the only factor
driving the relationship being estimated, we expect a coe¢ cient equal to -1;
incomplete substitution would correspond to a coe¢ cient between -1 and 0; a
coe¢ cient not statistically di⁄erent from 0 would imply no substitution, while
a positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient would signal complementarity between
loans from the two bank categories. As it is not possible to include ￿xed ef-
fects, we included in the regression controls for the main ￿rms￿characteristics
(i.e. risk of default, size, economic sector and region) to capture other factors
18which might potentially a⁄ect the relationship between the dependent vari-
able and the regressor. Results (with and without controls) are reported in
Table 3, ￿rst and second columns. The estimated coe¢ cient of cred_lowcapi
is negative and highly signi￿cant, with an absolute size much lower than one,
thus suggesting that some substitution did take place, but was rather lim-
ited (namely, the increase in loans from highly-capitalized banks appears to
have compensated on average only around 30% of the decrease of loans from
less-capitalized banks).
Estimating the same regression in the pre-crisis period (September 2006-
March 2007) broadly con￿rms this interpretation of the results. We ex-
pect that at normal times, with no credit supply restrictions, the scope
for substitution is smaller, if any at all; indeed, the estimated coe¢ cient
of cred_lowcapi in the comparable pre-crisis period is much smaller in size
and with lower statistical signi￿cance (Table 3, third column).
Considering again the after-Lehman period, we also found some evi-
dence that the number of lenders a⁄ected borrowers￿ability to substitute
across banks, as one would expect. We computed a new dummy variable,
few_lendersi, for ￿rms that have less than 4 lenders (roughly 38% of the
total; the 25th percentile of the distribution is 3). The results are reported in
Table 3, fourth column; for the latter category of ￿rms, the estimated coe¢ -
cient of cred_lowcapi is much smaller in size and not statistically signi￿cant,
whereas for ￿rms that borrow from at least 4 lenders the estimate is highly
signi￿cant and very similar in size to that previously commented.
5 Flight to quality and evergreening
5.1 Heterogeneity of credit supply restrictions across
￿rms
We now turn to the investigation of a speci￿c aspect of the contraction of
credit supply, namely the occurrence of a ￿ ight to quality away from risky
borrowers and its heterogeneity across banks.
We start by analyzing whether and how the (capital-related) credit supply
restriction was di⁄erentiated across ￿rm￿ s types. We considered four main
￿rm￿ s characteristics, namely size, export propensity, risk of default and pro-
ductivity. The corresponding variables were interacted with low_capb, ￿rst
each at a time and then all together; results are reported in Table 4. The
19contraction of loan supply from less-capitalized banks was signi￿cantly more
pronounced for smaller ￿rms (i.e., ￿rms with less than 50 employees, identi-
￿ed by the dummy small_fi). As to export propensity, there is no evidence
that exporting ￿rms (identi￿ed by the dummy exporti) were hit more severely
by credit supply restrictions.20 With regard to productivity, there is no ev-
idence that more productive ￿rms have been shielded from the contraction
of credit supply (tfpi is the ￿rm￿ s Solow residual, sectorally de-meaned). Fi-
nally, and most interestingly for our purposes, there is some evidence that
credit supply restrictions have been stronger for riskier ￿rms (high_riski is
a dummy for ￿rms whose Zscore is in the 7-9 range).
The evidence found for low_capb￿small_fi and low_capb￿high_riski re-
minds the notion of the ￿ ight to quality described by Bernanke et al. (1996),
based on the role of agency costs. Notice however that our ￿ndings are
slightly di⁄erent, as in our analysis agency costs are captured by ￿rm-speci￿c
￿xed e⁄ects. The estimated coe¢ cient of low_capb ￿ small_fi and that of
low_capb ￿ high_riski capture an additional impact on lending to smaller
or riskier ￿rms, speci￿c to poor bank capitalization, which is not related to
di⁄erences in agency costs compared to other borrowers. One possible factor
underlying this form of ￿ ight to quality linked to bank capital, as mentioned
in Section 2, is the e⁄ect of the higher risk-sensitiveness of Basel II capital
requirements. Other factors potentially relevant include evergreening and
￿ patience￿ . The di⁄erent mechanisms imply di⁄erences in lending patterns
across banks, according to size and organization.
5.2 Flight to quality: Heterogeneity across banks
A ￿rst dimension to be investigated is bank size. In the Italian banking sector
￿ as in most developed banking sectors world-wide ￿ small, local banks
coexist with large, multi-national banking groups. The di⁄erences in bank￿ s
organization and decision-making are likely to potentially a⁄ect the attitude
towards borrower￿ s risk. For example, with regard to evergreening, providing
￿ cheap￿credit to a borrower with high risk of default, in order to postpone
credit losses, is presumable easier for a smaller bank where discretion in
lending decisions is higher and the weight of credit scoring is lower than for a
20Given that these ￿rms have been harshly hit by the collapse of world demand, this
is an interesting ￿nding since it reveals that concerns that ￿ short-termist￿banks might
possibly reduce credit to these ￿rms, which represent the dynamic and healthy core of the
Italian productive system, seem unfounded.
20larger bank, where lending decisions are based on more automatic procedures.
Indeed, by introducing bank size into our analysis of lending patterns to risky
borrowers, a clear di⁄erence emerges. Consider the following regression:
￿credb;i = ￿ + ￿1 ￿ low_capb + ￿2 ￿ (low_capb ￿ high_riski) (7)
+￿3 ￿ [low_capb ￿ high_riski ￿ (1 ￿ largeb)] + ￿4 ￿ largeb
+￿i + "b;i .
The results are reported in Table 5, second column. Given the speci￿-
cation of this model ￿ namely the presence of the triple interaction term
low_capb￿high_riski￿(1￿largeb) ￿ the coe¢ cient of low_capb￿high_riski
captures the ￿ ight to quality e⁄ect (i.e. the reallocation of credit away from
riskier borrowers) for larger banks alone. Such coe¢ cient is negative and
highly signi￿cant; interestingly, thus, the evidence of a reallocation away
from riskier borrowers is much stronger for larger banks (both in size and
statistical signi￿cance) than for the average less-capitalized bank (Table 5,
￿rst column).21 On the other hand, the coe¢ cient of low_capb￿high_riski￿
(1￿largeb) is positive and highly signi￿cant, showing that the lending pattern
to riskier borrowers by smaller less-capitalized banks is signi￿cantly di⁄erent
from that of larger banks ￿ namely, the ￿ ight to quality of smaller banks
is lower compared to that of larger banks. Moreover, for such smaller (less-
capitalized) banks there is no evidence altogether of ￿ ight to quality, since
the total reallocation e⁄ect towards riskier borrowers by such banks is given
by c ￿2+ c ￿3, which is non-negative.22 Importantly, all the results are robust to
the inclusion in the regression of all double interactions among the variables
in the equation (Table 5, third column).23
As anticipated throughout the paper, there are at least three possible
21The ￿rst column of Table 5 reports again, for comparison purposes, the regression
presented in Table 4, fourth column.
22In mathematical terms, it can be readily seen that, for smaller banks (i.e. those for
which largeb=0), @
@ change of loans
@ low _ cap
@ high_risk = c ￿2+ c ￿3. Indeed, based on this regression there is
evidence of ￿ ight to risk for smaller banks, since c ￿2+ c ￿3=0.504, with the hypothesis of
c ￿2+ c ￿3 = 0 being rejected at 1% statistical level (F-statistic=13.38, with p-value .000).
23The positive coe¢ cient for low_capb ￿(1￿largeb) signals that the e⁄ect of capital on
lending is more important for larger banks. This may re￿ ect di⁄erent ownership patterns
(which may interfere with banks￿ability to promptly adjust their capital) or more careful
monitoring by market participants on larger and listed banks.
21explanations for the ￿nding that, in striking di⁄erence with larger less-
capitalized banks, smaller ones have not reallocated their credit away from
riskier borrowers after Lehman.
One explanation is that, compared to larger banks, smaller ones are less
a⁄ected by the new Basle II risk-sensitive capital requirements and did not
reallocate at all their loan portfolio in order to save on scarce capital. An-
other potential explanation is evergreening, on the ground that, as already
mentioned, any reallocation of credit in favor of borrowers with a bad credit
score ￿ ￿nalized to avoid or postpone the realization of losses ￿ is presum-
ably easier in the case of smaller banks. A third possible explanation is that
smaller banks have better (soft) information on riskier borrowers, compared
to that of larger banks; this would allow smaller banks to keep funding bor-
rowers with bad credit scores that have good economic fundamentals and
are just undergoing temporary ￿nancial di¢ culties. In such case, the lack of
￿ ￿ ight from risk￿by smaller banks would be evidence of virtuous ￿ patience￿ ,
as opposed to the suboptimal myopia (short-termism) of larger banks.24
As to the ￿rst explanation, when the adoption of Basle II will be com-
pleted, some technical aspects of the new capital requirements will indeed
presumably deliver a higher risk-sensitiveness by larger banks (which are
more likely to adopt the ￿ internal rating system￿ ). However, the implementa-
tion has been gradual and, in the period under consideration, was still par-
tial.25 It appears therefore unlikely that the di⁄erences documented above
are entirely justi￿ed by the e⁄ect of Basle II regulation. While the latter
e⁄ect may be an interesting issue for future research, in the rest of this sec-
tion we conduct other exercises aimed at disentangling the ￿ evergreening￿
explanation from that based on ￿ patience￿ .
24This interpretation, however, seems inconsistent with the negative and signi￿cant
coe¢ cient for (1￿largeb)￿high_riski, which suggests that the lenience of smaller lenders
towards risky borrowers is speci￿c to the lowly capitalized smaller intermediaries.
25The sensitivity of new capital requirements to the risk of individual borrowers is
maximized under the ￿ internal ratings-based￿(IRB) approach, which is typically chosen
by larger banks. Under the alternative system (￿ standardized￿approach), all borrowers
that are not rated by the rating agencies are given the same weight in the computation
of capital requirements, regardless of the actual individual risk pro￿le. The share of loans
covered by the IRB system in the period September 2008-March 2009 for the few (large
and small) banks which adopted it varied between roughly 40 and 70%.
225.3 Corroborating the ￿ evergreening￿explanation
As just argued, the ￿ndings of Table 5, second and third column, might
re￿ ect ￿ patience￿by smaller less-capitalized banks ￿ as opposed to myopia
of larger banks ￿ instead of evergreening. Indeed, this is a general limi-
tation of all balance sheet indicators of borrowers￿quality that are used in
the evergreening literature, arising from the fact that they do not take into
any account ￿rms￿future prospects.26 Thus, by using these measures, it is
not possible to distinguish true forbearance lending from e¢ cient debt re-
structuring, whereby a non myopic lender helps a borrower, who is currently
distressed but whose expected pro￿tability is potentially high, go through
temporary di¢ culties. The latter would be typically the case of a ￿rm which
got involved in substantial restructuring, funded by debt, thanks to which it
is regaining its competitiveness.27
A simple but rather powerful method to discriminate between the two al-
ternative explanations is integrating the information of (￿nancially-focused)
balance sheet indicators with that of indicators which are, arguably, bet-
ter proxies of the ￿rm￿ s economic fundamentals and competitiveness, and
therefore more forward-looking measures of its economic prospects, such as
productivity.
We therefore replicated the regressions reported in Table 5 by replacing
high_riski with a proxy for bad (impaired) borrowers, imp_bori, which
is equal to 1 if high_riski=1 and, at the same time, the ￿rm￿ s Solow
residual, sectorally de-meaned, is lower than the sample median. After
having identi￿ed bad borrowers in this way, any evidence of reallocation
26An alternative approach to the identi￿cation of impaired borrowers has been adopted
by Caballero et al. (2008). In that paper, bad borrowers are identi￿ed as those receiving
an interest rate subsidy, which in turn is identi￿ed by comparing, for any ￿rm and year
in the sample, total interest expenses with an estimated lower bound. As it is not based
on indicators of current performances, this approach o⁄ers the main advantage of being
inherently more forward-looking. Another more forward-looking measure adopted is stock
returns, as in Peek and Rosengren (2005). The main limitation in this case is that such
information can be obtained only for listed ￿rms, which tend to be only large ￿rms. Also,
one could argue that during crises stock prices are not as e¢ ciently determined as in
normal times.
27There is speci￿c evidence that this factor may have been relevant in our context.
Bugamelli et al. (2008) document, by analyzing a dataset including our sample of ￿rms,
that substantive ￿rms￿restructuring occurred in the Italian manufacturing and services
sectors in the last decade, as a response to the introduction of the euro and the need to
face global competition.
23of credit towards them (or weaker reallocation away from them) can be
hardly interpreted as evidence of ￿ patience￿ . The results with imp_bori
are reported in Table 6 (whose structure replicates that of Table 5; they
strongly con￿rm, and possibly strengthen, previous evidence. The ￿ ￿ ight
from bad borrowers￿by larger banks, captured by the estimated coe¢ cient
of low_capb ￿ imp_bori in columns 2-3, has intensi￿ed (the size of the coef-
￿cient has roughly doubled compared to that of Table 5). The coe¢ cient of
low_capb ￿imp_bori ￿(1￿largeb), which captures the di⁄erence of behavior
between smaller and larger banks, has remained positive and highly signi￿-
cant; if anything, its size appears sharply increased as well. Overall, again,
there is no evidence of ￿ ￿ ight from bad borrowers￿by smaller banks (i.e. the
hypothesis of c ￿2+ c ￿3=0 cannot be rejected).28
Notice that the ￿ndings documented in Table 6, columns 2-3, lend sup-
port to the explanation based on evergreening also vis-￿-vis that based on
Basle II regulations. In fact, if the lack of ￿ ight to quality for smaller banks
(documented in Table 5) were justi￿ed only by the di⁄erential impact of
new capital requirements, adding borrowers￿productivity into the analysis
should leave the results broadly unchanged, since the rating methods used
under the IRB approach typically focus on balance sheet variables (such as
those summarized in Zscore), and do not take into account measures of ￿rms￿
productivity and competitiveness. If anything, the use of imp_bori instead
of high_riski should attenuate the observed di⁄erence between large and
small banks, since, in the absence of evergreening, small banks should reallo-
cate their credit away from the ￿ bad borrowers￿identi￿ed by imp_bori even
if that does not give them the full advantages, in terms of lower risk-weighted
capital ratios, brought by Basle II and enjoyed by larger banks. As we saw,
on the contrary, the observed di⁄erence between larger and smaller banks
widened.
Going back to the comparison between the ￿ evergreening￿and the ￿ pa-
28A further robustness exercise is the following. Since the aim is that of investigating
the extension of credit to risky borrowers for the purpose of avoiding losses on pre-existing
loans, it is appropriate to include, among the borrowers which may potentially bene￿t from
evergreening, only ￿rms which, at the beginning of the period being considered (i.e., Sep-
tember 2008), were actively borrowing from a given bank. To this purpose, we estimated
the regressions reported in Table 6 after dropping the bank/￿rm observations associated
to ￿rms with imp_bori =1 and no outstanding loans from a given bank. After doing so,
the dummy imp_bori identi￿es (only and all) the potential recipients of ￿ evergreening￿
loans. Results are substantially unchanged; they are reported in Table A7 in Appendix II.
24tience￿explanations, another way of testing the hypothesis that loans to
riskier borrowers might actually represent good pro￿t opportunities ￿ with
smaller less-capitalized banks being in a better position to detect them ￿
is by looking at interest rate developments at the bank-￿rm level. This is
feasible since have information on average nominal interest rates for each
bank-￿rm relationship over the same period. The rationale for looking at
interest rates is that ￿ genuine￿loans (i.e. non associated to evergreening) to
riskier but pro￿table borrowers should be associated to higher interest rates.
Quite to contrary, interest rates on the loans extended by smaller less-
capitalized banks to riskier borrowers turned out not to be statistically dif-
ferent from those on other loans. See Table 7, which for simplicity replicates
the structure of Tables 5, with the dependent variable being replaced by in-
terest rates at bank-￿rm level (average over the period of interest). For our
purposes, we do not need to provide a structural interpretation of all the
parameters in the regression; we simply notice that the estimated coe¢ cient
of low_capb￿high_riski￿(1￿largeb) is clearly not statistically di⁄erent from
zero (Table 7, second and third column).
5.4 The role of credit scoring
We have provided evidence corroborating the interpretation of our ￿ndings
based on forbearance lending. When initially putting forward this hypothesis,
we mentioned that one reason why evergreening might be easier for smaller
banks is the lower weight of credit scoring techniques. It seems natural,
therefore, to re-estimate previous regressions after replacing (1￿largeb) with
(1 ￿ scoring_bank). The results are documented in the fourth and ￿fth
column of, respectively, Tables 5, 6 and 7 (which replicate the second and
third column of the corresponding table). The ￿ndings clearly con￿rm those
obtained with (1 ￿ largeb). Namely, banks which rely extensively on credit
scoring did reallocate credit away from risky (bad) borrowers, while the others
did not (Tables 5 and 6). For the sake of comparing the explanatory power
of (1 ￿ largeb) with that of (1 ￿ scoring_bank) in capturing the allegedly
￿ evergreening￿e⁄ect, we also included all regressors in the same equation. The
results, reported in the sixth column of, respectively, Tables 5 and 6, show
that the estimated coe¢ cient of [low_capb￿high_riski￿(1￿largeb)] maintains
its high statistical signi￿cance, unlike that of [low_capb ￿ high_riski ￿ (1 ￿
25scoring_bank)].29 This suggests that the weight of credit scoring has been
only one of the factors underlying our ￿ndings; additional factors associated
to bank￿ s size played a role, presumably related to organizational aspects.
For example, the relevance of agency costs in major groups, documented
in the literature (e.g., Stein, 2002), might induce a tendency to centralize
decision processes and permanently limit the autonomy of local loan o¢ cer,
possibly making evergreening more di¢ cult.
6 Credit supply restrictions and relationship
lending
Finally, we investigated whether and how the capital-related contraction of
credit supply documented in Section 4 is a⁄ected by the intensity of bank-
￿rms relationships. We did so by including in the main regressions the share
of credit that a given ￿rm receives from a given bank, cred_shareb;i, alone
and interacted with low_capb. The results for the model without and with
controls are reported, respectively, in the ￿rst and second columns of Table
8. The estimated coe¢ cients of low_capb ￿ cred_shareb;i and cred_shareb;i
are both negative and statistically signi￿cant.30 Overall, therefore, we ￿nd
no evidence that the capital-related contraction of credit supply has been
attenuated by intense bank-￿rms relationships, or, more in general, that
credit supply during the turmoil has been positively a⁄ected by relationship
lending.31 This is consistent with the ￿nding by Peek and Rosengren (2005)
that, during the ￿ lost decade￿in Japan, main banks were less likely to increase
lending compared to other banks.
Notice, however, that our analytical framework is not best suited for an
analysis of relationship lending, which is not the aim of this paper. First,
the non negligible category of ￿rms borrowing from a single lender ￿ for
which relationship lending is most valuable ￿ is excluded by our analysis,
29As to Table 7, there is some evidence that the estimated coe¢ cient of low_capb ￿
high_riski ￿ (1 ￿ scoring_bankb) is even negative and statistically signi￿cant, showing
that interest rates on the loans extended to riskier borrowers by lowly-capitalized banks
which make little use of scoring techniques are lower than those on other loans.
30Similar evidence has been obtained by analyzing credit ￿ ows to smaller ￿rms, that
typically bene￿t more from relationship lending (Table 8, third column).
31Substantially similar results have been obtained by using as dependant variable the
rate of growth of loans (see Table A8).
26based on the use of ￿rm-level ￿xed e⁄ects which requires lenders￿multiplic-
ity. Moreover, for the ￿rms included in our analysis some of the e⁄ects of
lending relationships might be captured by the ￿xed e⁄ects. For example,
the presence of a main bank may provide some kind of ￿ certi￿cation￿allowing
other intermediaries to lend to the same ￿rm, at lower interest rates, while
saving on monitoring costs.32
We also investigated the link between the intensity of bank-￿rm rela-
tionships and the lending patterns towards risky borrowers. We run the
main regressions reported in Table 6 after including cred_shareb;i, respec-
tively alone and interacted with [low_capb ￿ imp_bori ￿ (1 ￿ largeb)] and
[low_capb ￿ imp_bori ￿ (1 ￿ scoring_bankb)]. The results are reported in
Table 9; there is no evidence that the (supposedly) ￿ evergreening￿e⁄ect is
either strengthened or weakened by relationship lending.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented evidence of a contraction of credit supply,
associated to low bank capitalization and scarce liquidity, over the 6-month
period following Lehman￿ s bankruptcy.
We have shown that the dampening e⁄ect on credit supply of less-capitalized
banks has been quite sizeable; moreover, we o⁄ered some evidence that the
ability of borrowers to substitute loans from less-capitalized banks with loans
from the other banks has been limited, and almost nil in the case of ￿rms
that borrow from few lenders.
By analyzing the impact of the credit supply restrictions across ￿rm￿ s
types, we also found that larger less-capitalized banks have reallocated their
credit away from riskier ￿rms. Quite strikingly, this ￿ ￿ ight to quality￿has
not been observed for smaller less-capitalized banks.
A ￿rst explanation for this dichotomy hinges on the potentially di⁄erent
impact of Basle II capital regulations on larger vs. smaller banks; however,
the implementation of the new, more risk-sensitive capital requirements was
still partial during the period of interest, and it appears unlikely to entirely
32See Casolaro and Mistrulli (2008). In general, an analysis of the role of relationship
lending cannot neglect ￿rms￿bank-invariant characteristics. De Mitri et al. (2009) conduct
an analysis along these lines based on Italian ￿rm-level data (that include our sample);
they ￿nd a positive link between several measures of relationship lending and ￿rms￿credit
availability after Lehman.
27justify the di⁄erence in the observed ￿ ￿ ight to quality￿ . Another potential
explanation hinges on evergreening. The rational is that evergreening is
arguably easier for smaller banks, whose lending decision processes are more
￿ exible and less constrained by credit scores, than for larger banks. A third
potential explanation is ￿ patience￿by smaller banks, in the sense described
in this paper. In order to disentangle between the latest two explanations we
used data on borrowers￿productivity and interest rates at bank-￿rm level.
This evidence suggests that some evergreening did take place.
Overall, this paper innovates by combining two separate strands of the lit-
erature on bank capital and lending supply, namely those on capital-related
contractions of credit supply and evergreening. Our results indicate that
pressure on bank capital may induce, simultaneously, two opposite lending
biases. A generalized excessive tightening and some excessive loosening of
credit policies towards risky borrowers (evergreening) may represent two dif-
ferent faces of banks￿response to capital constraints.
28Figure 1 
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Source: Bank of Italy and European Central Bank 
Note:  The lending standards indicator is based on the data of the Eurosystem’s quarterly Bank 
Lending Survey. It represents the tightening of lending conditions, with respect to previous quarter, 
implemented through reductions of the amount of the extended loans or granted credit line (net 
percentage). 
29Table 2
Testing for Credit Supply Restrictions
Dep. variable: Change of loans over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank (1) (2) (3) (4)
variables Pre-crisis
Low_capb -.835￿￿￿ -.867￿￿￿ -1.086￿￿￿ .036
(.066) (.067) (.076) (.047)
High_liqb - .447￿￿￿ .560￿￿￿ -.078
- (.084) (.144) (.096)
Largeb - - -.142￿￿￿ -.090￿
- - (.045) (.049)
Scoring_bankb - - .219￿￿ .105
- - (.088) (.072)
Coopb - - -.439￿ -.003
- - (.137) (.130)
No. ￿rms 2,558 2,558 2,546 2,358
No. obs. 19,576 19,576 17,596 16,602
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. The dependent variable is the change of loans from individual banks over the period
September 2008-March 2009, normalized to ￿rm￿ s assets; regressors data refer to September 2008. In
column 4, the dependent variable is de￿ned over the period September 2006-March 2007, and regressors
data refer to September 2006. Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors in brackets
(cluster at individual ￿rm level).




Dep. variable: Change of loans from highly-capitalized banks over ￿rm￿ s assets
Firm variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pre-crisis
Cred_lowcapi -.306￿￿￿ -.297￿￿￿ -.096￿ -
(.067) (.070) (.051) -
Cred_lowcapi ￿ (1-Few_lendersi) - - - -.316￿￿￿
- - - (.083)
Cred_lowcapi ￿ Few_lendersi - - - -.166
- - - (.107)
Few_lendersi - - - -.753￿￿
- - - (.360)
Credit risk dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Size dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Sectoral dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes
No. ￿rms/obs. 2,558 2,452 2,371 2,452
Note: OLS estimation with ￿rm-level data. Each column corresponds to a regression. In columns
1-2 and 4, the dependent variable is the change of loans from highly-capitalized banks, normalized to
￿rm￿ s assets, de￿ned over the period September 2008-March 2009, and regressors data refer to September
2008; in column 3 the dependent variable is de￿ned over the period September 2006-March 2007 and
regressors data refer to September 2006. Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors
in brackets (cluster at individual ￿rm level). Credit risk dummies identify ￿rms whose Zscore value is
between, respectively, 1 and 3 (￿ low risk￿ ), 4 and 6 (￿ medium risk￿ ) and 7 and 9 (￿ high risk￿ ) . Size
dummies identify four categories of ￿rms: 20-50 employees, 51-200 employees, 201-1000 employees, over
1000 employees. Sector dummies refer to 2-digit sectors. Regional dummies refer to four macro-regions:
North-West, North-East, Center and South.
￿Signi￿cant at the 10-percent level; ￿￿signi￿cant at the 5-percent level; ￿￿￿signi￿cant at the 1-percent
level.
31Table 4
Heterogeneity of Credit Supply Restrictions across Firms
Dep. variable: Change of loans over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank and ￿rm variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low_capb -.744￿￿￿ -.799￿￿￿ -.964￿￿￿ -.808￿￿￿ -1.032￿￿￿
(.069) (.143) (.116) (.074) (.201)
Low_capb ￿ Small_fi -.384￿￿ - - - -.460￿￿
(.180) - - - (.211)
Low_capb ￿ Exporti - -.050 - - .011
- (.161) - - (.186)
Low_capb ￿ Tfpi - - .227 - .191
- - (.138) - (.157)
Low_capb ￿ High_riski - - - -.194 -.367￿
- - - (.168) (.190)
High_liqb - - - - .583￿￿￿
- - - - (.145)
Largeb - - - - -.145￿￿￿
- - - - (.045)
Scoring_bankb - - - - .195￿￿
- - - - (.089)
Coopb - - - - -.441￿￿￿
- - - - (.138)
No. ￿rms 2,558 2,558 2,558 2,452 2,440
No. obs. 19,576 19,576 19,576 18,981 17,074
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. The dependent variable is the change of loans from individual banks, normalized to
￿rm￿ s assets, de￿ned over the period September 2008-March 2009. Regressors data refer to, respectively,
September 2008 for bank variables and 2007 averages for ￿rm variables. Parameter estimates are reported
with robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual ￿rm level). Small_fi is a dummy for ￿rms
with less than 50 employees; exporti is a dummy for exporting ￿rms (roughly 70% of the total); high_riski
is a dummy for ￿rms with high risk of default (as signalled by a Zscore value between 7 and 9), and tfpi is
a dummy for ￿rms whose total factor productivity (demeaned at sectoral level) is higher than the median.
￿Signi￿cant at the 10-percent level; ￿￿signi￿cant at the 5-percent level; ￿￿￿signi￿cant at the 1-percent
level.
32Table 5
Flight to Quality: Heterogeneity across Banks
Dep. variable: Change of loans over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank and ￿rm variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low_capb -.808￿￿￿ -.805￿￿￿ -1.259￿￿￿ -.994￿￿￿ -1.042￿￿￿ -1.551￿￿￿
(.074) (.074) (.107) (.083) (.088) (.120)
Low_capb ￿ High_riski -.194 -.639￿￿￿ -.483￿ -.458￿￿ -.462￿￿ -.729￿￿
(.168) (.222) (.263) (.197) (.206) (.294)
Low_capb ￿ High_riski - 1.143￿￿￿ .669￿￿ - - .712￿￿
￿ (1-Largeb) - (.203) (.304) - - (.340)
Largeb - -.162￿￿￿ .118￿￿ - - .314￿￿￿
- (.043) (.061) - - (.069)
High_riski ￿ (1-Largeb) - - -.447￿￿￿ - - -.540￿￿￿
- - (.142) - - (.151)
Low_capb ￿ (1-Largeb) - - 1.197￿￿￿ - - 1.563￿￿￿
- - (.131) - - (.149)
Low_capb ￿ High_riski - - - 1.253￿￿￿ 1.061￿￿ .606
￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - (.327) (.467) (.455)
Scoring_bankb - - - .187￿￿ .270￿￿￿ .101
- - - (.084) (.097) (.100)
High_riski ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - - -.427 -.142
- - - - (.297) (.291)
Low_capb ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - - .681￿￿￿ -.135
- - - - (.196) (.200)
No. ￿rms 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,440 2,440 2,440
No. obs. 18,981 18,981 18,981 17,074 17,074 17,074
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. Variables and estimation period are as de￿ned in Table 4; high_riski is a dummy for
￿rms whose Zscore is in the 7-9 range. Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors in
brackets (cluster at individual ￿rm level). ￿ Signi￿cant at the 10-percent level; ￿￿ 5-percent level; ￿￿￿
1-percent level.
33Table 6
Corroborating the ￿ Evergreening￿Explanation
Dep. variable: Change of loans over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank and ￿rm variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low_capb -.792￿￿￿ -.789￿￿￿ -1.256￿￿￿ -.995￿￿￿ -1.057￿￿￿ -1.574￿￿￿
(.068) (.068) (.100) (.077) (.082) (.112)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori -.671￿￿ -1.266￿￿￿ -1.158￿￿￿ -.992￿￿￿ -.947￿￿￿ -1.423￿￿￿
(.277) (.360) (.413) (.330) (.342) (.462)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori - 1.676￿￿￿ 1.402￿￿￿ - - 1.657￿￿￿
￿ (1-Largeb) - (.346) (.486) - - (.569)
Largeb - -.197￿￿￿ .158￿￿￿ - - .360￿￿￿
- (.040) (.057) - - (.064)
Imp_bori ￿ (1-Largeb) - - -.589￿￿￿ - - -.710￿￿￿
- - (.213) - - (.233)
Low_capb ￿ (1-Largeb) - - 1.212￿￿￿ - - 1.564￿￿￿
- - (.121) - - (.137)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori - - - 1.292￿￿￿ .645 -.350
￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - (.380) (.564) (.563)
Scoring_bankb - - - .145￿ .346￿￿￿ .154
- - - (.083) (.099) (.100)
Imp_bori ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - - .003 .446
- - - - (.338) (.321)
Low_capb ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - - .836￿￿￿ .009
- - - - (.189) (.190)
No. ￿rms 2,452 2,452 2,452 2,440 2,440 2,440
No. obs. 18,981 18,981 18,981 17,074 17,074 17,074
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. Variables and estimation period are as de￿ned in Table 4; imp_bori is a dummy for ￿rms
whose Zscore is in the 7-9 range and whose productivity (sectorally de-meaned) is lower than the sample
median. Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual
￿rm level). ￿ Signi￿cant at the 10-percent level; ￿￿ 5-percent level; ￿￿￿ 1-percent level.
34Table 7
Evergreening: Robustness on Interest Rates
Dep. variable: Interest rates at the bank-￿rm level
Bank and ￿rm variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low_capb .035 .032 .044 .038 .022 .070￿
(.028) (.028) (.036) (.029) (.030) (.037)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori -.049 -.063 -.110 .078 .067 -.041
(.095) (.105) (.119) (.104) (.105) (.129)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori - .034 .151 - - .274
￿ (1-Largeb) - (.162) (.194) - - (.205)
Largeb - -.036 -.049 - - -.070￿
- (.027) (.035) - - (.038)
Imp_bori ￿ (1-Largeb) - - -.101 - - -.082
- - (.123) - - (.133)
Low_capb ￿ (1-Largeb) - - -.029 - - -.131￿￿
- - (.056) - - (.059)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori - - - -.484￿￿ -.347 -.480￿
￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - (.190) (.256) (.265)
Scoring_bankb - - - -.020 .018 .059
- - - (.047) (.055) (.056)
Imp_bori ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - - -.302￿ -.253
- - - - (.165) (.175)
Low_capb ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - - .184￿ .251￿￿
- - - - (.107) (.111)
No. ￿rms 2,286 2,286 2,286 2,267 2,267 2,267
No. obs. 13,373 13,373 13,373 12,763 12,763 12,763
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. Variables and estimation period are as de￿ned in Table 4; imp_bori is a dummy for ￿rms
whose Zscore is in the 7-9 range and whose productivity (sectorally de-meaned) is lower than the sample
median. Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual
￿rm level). ￿ Signi￿cant at the 10-percent level; ￿￿ 5-percent level; ￿￿￿ 1-percent level.
35Table 8
Credit Supply Restrictions and Relationship Lending
Dep. variable: Change of loans over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank and ￿rm variables (1) (2) (3)
Low_capb -.656￿￿￿ -.785￿￿￿ -.799￿￿￿
(.073) (.083) (.084)
Low_capb ￿ Cred_shareb;i -.019￿￿ -.030￿￿￿ -.026￿￿￿
(.008) (.008) (.010)
Cred_shareb;i -.031￿￿￿ -.028￿￿￿ -.025￿￿￿
(.004) (.004) (.005)
High_liqb - .434￿￿￿ .431￿￿￿
- (.127) (.128)
Largeb - -.227￿￿￿ -.228￿￿￿
- (.049) (.049)
Scoring_bankb - .113 .112
- (.088) (.088)
Coopb - -.451￿ -.447￿￿￿
- (.140) (.140)
Low_capb ￿ Cred_shareb;i ￿ Small_fi - - -.007
- - (.014)
Cred_shareb;i ￿ Small_fi - - -.012
- - (.008)
No. ￿rms 2,552 2,536 2,536
No. obs. 18,378 16,501 16,501
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. Variables and estimation period are as de￿ned in Table 4. Parameter estimates are
reported with robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual ￿rm level). ￿Signi￿cant at the
10-percent level; ￿￿signi￿cant at the 5-percent level; ￿￿￿signi￿cant at the 1-percent level.
36Table 9
Evergreening and Relationship Lending
Dep. variable: Change of loans over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank and ￿rm variables (1) (2) (3)
Low_capb -1.307￿￿￿ (.091) -1.117￿￿￿ (.076) -1.645￿￿￿ (.103)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori -1.042￿￿￿ (.400) -.875￿￿￿ (.331) -1.298￿￿￿ (.445)
Cred_shareb;i -.038￿￿￿ (.004) -.039￿￿￿ (.004) -.039￿￿￿ (.004)
Largeb .094 (.058) - .296￿￿￿ (.065)
Imp_bori ￿ (1-Largeb) -.358 (.230) - -.506 (.264)
Low_capb ￿ (1-Largeb) 1.233￿￿￿ (.115) - 1.583￿￿￿ (.133)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori ￿ (1-Largeb) .961￿ (.524) - 1.526￿￿ (.650)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori .025 (.023) - -.008 (.031)
￿ (1-Largeb)￿ Cred_shareb;i
Scoring_bankb - .296￿￿￿ (.099) .150 (.100)
Imp_bori ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - .218 (.352) .540 (.345)
Low_capb ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - 1.053￿ (.194) 1.053￿ (.194)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - .142 (.700) -1.072 (.830)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori - .031 (.020) .050 (.038)
￿ (1-Scoring_bankb)￿ Cred_shareb;i
No. ￿rms 2,444 2,426 2,426
No. obs. 17,612 15,830 15,830
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. Variables and estimation period are as de￿ned in Table 6. Parameter estimates are
reported with robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual ￿rm level). ￿ Signi￿cant at the
10-percent level; ￿￿ 5-percent level; ￿￿￿ 1-percent level.
37A Appendix I: Data sources, de￿nition of vari-
ables and some descriptive statistics
Bank and credit variables. Data on outstanding loans come from the Italian
National Credit Register, maintained at the Bank of Italy. For each bor-
rower, banks have to report to the Register, on a monthly basis, the amount
of each loan, respectively granted and utilized, for all loans exceeding a given
threshold.33 The sample of banks is given by the set of intermediaries re-
porting a positive amount of credit utilized or extended to at least one ￿rm
in the sample of ￿rms on either end-September 2008 or end-March 2009 or
at both dates. Data on banks￿balance sheets refer to the end of September
2008. Summary statistics on the variables are reported in Table A1. Total
assets are expressed in millions of euros. The capital ratio is computed as the
ratio of total capital to risk-weighted assets and is expressed in percentage
points. The numerator of the liquidity ratio is the sum of the amount of
cash and securities other than shares, the denominator is total assets. Net
interbank liabilities are expressed as a ratio of total assets. The ￿gures for
the ￿ve major banking groups refer to the set of banks belonging to the ￿ve
largest banking holding companies. The data for cooperative ￿rms (BCC)
refer to small local cooperative banks subject to a speci￿c regulatory regime.
Firm variables. Data on employment and hours, labor compensation,
investment and capital stock are drawn from the Survey of Industrial and
Service Firms (SISF), carried out annually by the Bank of Italy. Data on
gross production, purchases of intermediate goods and inventories of ￿nished
goods are drawn from the Company Accounts Data Service (CADS - Centrale
dei Bilanci). Total factor productivity (on a gross-output basis) is computed
as follows. Gross output is measured as the value of ￿rm-level production
(source: CADS) de￿ ated by the sectoral output de￿ ator computed by IS-
TAT (the National Statistical Institute). Employment is the ￿rm-level aver-
age number of employees over the year (source: SIM); ￿rm-level man-hours
include overtime hours (source: SIM). Intermediate inputs are measured as
￿rm-level net purchases of intermediate goods of energy, materials and busi-
ness services (source: CADS), de￿ ated by the corresponding industry de￿ ator
computed by ISTAT. Investment is ￿rm-level total ￿xed investment in build-
33The threshold was equal to euro 75,000 until December 2008 and was then reduced to
euro 30,000.
38ings, machinery and equipment and vehicles, plus investment in software
and patents, (source: SIM), de￿ ated by the industry￿ s ISTAT investment
de￿ ator. Capital is the beginning-of-period stock of capital equipment and
non-residential buildings at 1997 prices. To compute it, we applied the per-
petual inventory method backwards by using ￿rm-level investment data from
SIM and industry depreciation rates from ISTAT. The benchmark informa-
tion is that on the capital stock in 1997 (valued at replacement cost), which
was collected by a special section of the SIM Survey conducted for that year.
The capital de￿ ator is the industry capital de￿ ator computed by ISTAT.
Descriptive statistics on selected ￿rm variables are reported in the Table A2.
Table A1
Summary statistics of bank variables
(percent, unless otherwise indicated)
Five largest banking groups (62 banks) 25th pctile median 75th pctile mean
Total assets (milions euro) 2436 10553 24716 30427
Capital ratio 8.9 10.2 12.6 12.1
Liquidity ratio 4.9 6.5 8.3 7.3
All banks (488 banks)
Total assets (milions euro) 288 716 2384 6073
Capital ratio 10.5 13.0 16.8 15.0
Liquidity ratio 6.5 11.2 17.1 12.3
Source: Banking Supervision Register; data refer to September 2008.
Table A2
Summary statistics of ￿rm variables
(percent, unless otherwise indicated)
Variable 25th pctile median 75th pctile mean
Number of employees (units) 45 93 233 357
Real gross output growth -3.8 3.1 10.9 4.2
TFP growth -1.6 .6 3.0 .7
TFP level (log-di⁄erence from sectoral median) -12.7 5.1 18.8 .4
Labor revenue-share 9.6 15.5 22.9 18.4
Capital revenue-share 4.7 8.1 12.8 10.0
Materials revenue-share 64.0 74.8 83.1 71.6
Source: SIM and CADS; data refer to 2007.
39A Appendix II: Robustness
This section brie￿ y documents a number of robustness exercises conducted
on the results presented in Section 4 and 5, all of which have been referred
to in the main text.
A ￿rst set of exercises investigated the robustness, along four di⁄erent
dimensions, of the evidence of credit supply restrictions reported in Table 2.
We replaced the original dependent variable with the rate of growth of loans;
results are reported in Table A3 (extreme values of the dependent variable
were eliminated by dropping the top and bottom 5% of the distribution).34
We computed low_capb based on the median capital ratio (13.0) as thresh-
old, instead of the 25th percentile; see Table A4 (the size of the coe¢ cient is
lower, as expected, since the number of banks involved in the estimation of
the e⁄ect has doubled, and includes banks with relatively high capital ratios).
We changed the de￿nition of credit, by replacing, in the original dependent
variable, outstanding loans with total credit lines (utilized and non-utilized);
see Table A5 (it may be argued that this is a preferable indicator of credit
supply, since their level is chosen mainly by banks, whereas short-term de-
velopments of outstanding loans may also re￿ ect the choice of ￿rms, that can
increase or decrease the degree of utilization of existing credit lines). We run
the baseline regression with consolidated data (both the dependent variable
and the regressor low_capb); see Table A6. We also adjusted loan data for
the accounting e⁄ect of securitizations, by re-including loans securitized from
October 2008 to March 2009 into the stock of outstanding bank-￿rm loans at
March 2009 (see the Section 4.2 for a discussion of the rationale); see Table
A7.
A second set of exercises investigated the robustness (with respect to the
34This robustness check is important since our choice of the dependent variable might
potentially a⁄ect the identi￿cation of ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ects within our model. Consider,
for example, what would happen if ￿weak￿ (undercapitalized) banks were specialized,
before the crisis, in ￿weak￿￿rms (most hardly hit by the crisis). Given the de￿nition of
our benchmark dependent variable (i.e., absolute changes in credit), the values of such
variable might be of a di⁄erent order of magnitude across banks exposed to a di⁄erent
degree towards a given ￿rm or category of ￿rms, and in principle our ￿rm-speci￿c ￿xed-
e⁄ects might fall short of fully capturing demand e⁄ects. In such case, the observations
related to the banks more exposed to ￿weak￿ ￿rms (associated to the largest absolute
changes in credit) might possibly drive the estimate of the coe¢ cient of low_capb. Results
with the rate of growth of loans as dependent variable rule out this potential explanation
of our results.
40dataset) of the evidence on evergreening reported in Table 6. We included,
among the borrowers which may potentially bene￿t from evergreening, only
￿rms which, at the beginning of the period being considered, were actively
borrowing from a given bank. To this purpose, we estimated the regressions
reported in Table 6 after dropping the (few) observations associated to ￿rms
with imp_bori =1 and no outstanding loans by a given bank at Septem-
ber 2008. By doing so, the dummy imp_bori identi￿es (only and all) the
potential recipients of ￿ evergreening￿loans. See Table A8.
Finally, we checked the robustness of the evidence on relationship lending
with respect to the de￿nition of the dependent variable; namely, we repli-
cated the evidence reported in Table 8 after replacing the original dependent
variable with the rate of growth of loans. See Table A9.
41Table A3
Credit Supply Restrictions:
Robustness on the dependent variable (rate of growth)
Dep. variable: Rate of growth of loans
Bank (1) (2) (3) (4)
variables Pre-crisis
Low_capb -9.123￿￿￿ -9.025￿￿￿ -7.572￿￿￿ -2.406
(1.552) (1.606) (1.754) (1.550)
High_liqb - -.856 7.786￿￿ -2.273
- (2.396) (3.473) (3.872)
Largeb - - 4.302￿￿ -2.753￿
- - (1.766) (1.631)
Scoring_bankb - - 9.091￿￿￿ 4.285￿￿￿
- - (2.612) (2.898)
Coopb - - -8.498￿￿ 8.189
- - (3.811) (6.426)
No. ￿rms 2,205 2,205 2,165 2,028
No. obs. 11,008 11,008 9,964 10,541
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of loans from individual banks over the
period September 2008-March 2009; regressors data refer to September 2008. In column 4, the dependent
variable is de￿ned over the period September 2006-March 2007, and regressors data refer to September
2006. In all regressions, extreme values of the dependent variable were eliminated by dropping the top and
bottom 5% of the distribution. Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors in brackets
(cluster at individual ￿rm level). ￿Signi￿cant at the 10-percent level; ￿￿signi￿cant at the 5-percent level;
￿￿￿signi￿cant at the 1-percent level.
42Table A4
Credit Supply Restrictions:
Robustness on the threshold for capital ratio (median)
Dep. variable: Change of loans over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank (1) (2) (3) (4)
variables Pre-crisis
Low_capb -.463￿￿￿ -.459￿￿￿ -.422￿￿￿ .059
(.065) (.065) (.069) (.051)
High_liqb - .257￿￿￿ .299￿￿ -.071
- (.081) (.144) (.096)
Largeb - - -.240￿￿￿ -.087￿
- - (.045) (.049)
Scoring_bankb - - .189￿￿ .101
- - (.086) (.072)
Coopb - - -.249￿ -.005
- - (.133) (.130)
No. ￿rms 2,558 2,558 2,546 2,358
No. obs. 19,576 19,576 17,596 16,602
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of loans from individual banks over the
period September 2008-March 2009, normalized to ￿rm￿ s assets; regressors data refer to September 2008.
In column 4, the dependent variable is de￿ned over the period September 2006-March 2007, and regres-
sors data refer to September 2006. Low_capb is a dummy for banks whose capital ratio is lower than
the sample median (13.0). Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors in brackets
(cluster at individual ￿rm level). ￿Signi￿cant at the 10-percent level; ￿￿signi￿cant at the 5-percent level;
￿￿￿signi￿cant at the 1-percent level.
43Table A5
Credit Supply Restrictions:
Robustness on the de￿nition of credit (granted credit)
Dep. variable: Change of total credit lines over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank (1) (2) (3) (4)
variables Pre-crisis
Low_capb -1.758￿￿￿ -1.821￿￿￿ -2.235￿￿￿ .009
(.093) (.095) (.107) (.055)
Hig_liqb - .872￿￿￿ .989￿￿￿ .004
- (.129) (.233) (.105)
Largeb - - -.229￿￿￿ -.059
- - (.054) (.057)
Scoring_bankb - - .336￿￿￿ .289￿￿￿
- - (.101) (.086)
Coopb - - -.786￿￿￿ -.057
- - (.164) (.143)
No. ￿rms 2,530 2,530 2,518 2,325
No. obs. 19,333 19,333 17,371 16,439
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. The dependent variable is the change of total credit lines (utilized and not-utilized)
from individual banks over the period September 2008-March 2009, normalized to ￿rm￿ s assets; regressors
data refer to September 2008. In column 4, the dependent variable is de￿ned over the period September
2006-March 2007, and regressors data refer to September 2006. Parameter estimates are reported with
robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual ￿rm level). ￿Signi￿cant at the 10-percent level;
￿￿signi￿cant at the 5-percent level; ￿￿￿signi￿cant at the 1-percent level.
44Table A6
Credit Supply Restrictions:
Robustness with respect to consolidated bank data
Dep. variable: Change of loans (consolidated) over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank variables De￿nition of less-capitalized banks
(consolidated) Threshold on the consolidated capital ratio:
25th percentile (i.e., 11.0) Median (i.e., 13.2)
Low_cap_consb -.213￿￿￿ -.209￿￿
(.080) (.099)
No. ￿rms 2,557 2,557
No. obs. 14,890 14,890
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data consolidated at the banking group level. Each
column corresponds to a regression. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of loans from banking
groups (or individual banks, in the case of banks which do not belong to groups) over the period September
2008-March 2009, normalized to ￿rm￿ s assets; regressor data refer to September 2008. Parameter estimates
are reported with robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual ￿rm level). ￿Signi￿cant at the
10-percent level; ￿￿signi￿cant at the 5-percent level; ￿￿￿signi￿cant at the 1-percent level.
45Table A7
Credit Supply Restrictions:
Robustness with respect to the accounting e⁄ect of
securitizations
Dep. variable: Change of loans over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank (1) (2) (3)
variables
Low_capb -.819￿￿￿ -.851￿￿￿ -1.069￿￿￿
(.065) (.067) (.075)
High_liqb - .436￿￿￿ .550￿￿￿
- (.084) (.144)
Largeb - - -.137￿￿￿
- - (.045)
Scoring_bankb - - .212￿￿
- - (.087)
Coopb - - -.441￿￿￿
- - (.137)
No. ￿rms 2,558 2,558 2,546
No. obs. 19,578 19,578 17,596
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. The dependent variable is the change of loans from individual banks over the period
September 2008-March 2009, normalized to ￿rm￿ s assets; regressors data refer to September 2008. Loan
data include securitized loans. Parameter estimates are reported with robust standard errors in brackets
(cluster at individual ￿rm level). ￿Signi￿cant at the 10-percent level; ￿￿signi￿cant at the 5-percent level;
￿￿￿signi￿cant at the 1-percent level.
46Table A8
Evergreening:
Robustness with respect to the dataset
Dep. variable: Change of loans over ￿rm￿ s assets
Bank and ￿rm variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low_capb -.818￿￿￿ -.814￿￿￿ -1.287￿￿￿ -1.020￿￿￿ -1.085￿￿￿ -1.605￿￿￿
(.068) (.068) (.100) (.077) (.082) (.112)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori -.642￿￿ -1.302￿￿￿ -1.078￿￿￿ -.973￿￿￿ -.898￿￿￿ -1.318￿￿￿
(.271) (.347) (.405) (.325) (.337) (.452)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori - 1.836￿￿￿ 1.228￿￿ - - 1.406￿￿
￿ (1-Largeb) - (.347) (.491) - - (.576)
Largeb - -.236￿￿￿ .143￿￿ - - .349￿￿￿
- (.041) (.057) - - (.065)
Imp_bori ￿ (1-Largeb) - - -.249 - - -.408
- - (.232) - - (.267)
Low_capb ￿ (1-Largeb) - - 1.231￿￿￿ - - 1.584￿￿￿
- - (.121) - - (.138)
Low_capb ￿ Imp_bori - - - 1.646￿￿￿ .686 -.201
￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - (.436) (.604) (.641)
Scoring_bankb - - - .115 .339￿￿￿ .154
- - - (.084) (.100) (.102)
Imp_bori ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - - .326 .576￿
- - - - (.343) (.336)
Low_capb ￿ (1-Scoring_bankb) - - - - .862￿￿￿ .025
- - - - (.191) (.193)
No. ￿rms 2,444 2,444 2,444 2,428 2,428 2,428
No. obs. 18,565 18,565 18,565 16,703 16,703 16,703
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corresponds
to a regression. Variables and estimation period are as de￿ned in Table 6. Observations with Zscore￿7
and no reported outstanding loans at September 2008 are dropped from the sample. Parameter estimates
are reported with robust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual ￿rm level). ￿ Signi￿cant at the
10-percent level; ￿￿ 5-percent level; ￿￿￿ 1-percent level.
47Table A9
Credit Supply Restrictions and Relationship Lending:
Robustness on the dependent variable
Dep. variable: Rate of growth of loans
Bank and ￿rm variables (1) (2) (3)
Low_capb -13.149￿￿￿ -9.183￿￿￿ -9.164￿￿￿
(2.204) (2.503) (2.514)
Low_capb ￿ Cred_shareb;i .326￿￿￿ .112 .094
(.124) (.144) (.167)
Cred_shareb;i -.541￿￿￿ -.576￿￿￿ -.534￿￿￿
(.076) (.080) (.094)
High_liqb - 7.355￿￿ 7.401￿￿
- (3.454) (3.457)
Largeb - 5.190￿￿￿ 5.180￿￿￿
- (1.773) (1.774)
Scoring_bankb - 9.269￿￿￿ 9.271￿￿￿
- (2.618) (2.617)
Coopb - -8.694￿￿ -8.700￿￿
- (3.788) (3.785)
Low_capb ￿ Cred_shareb;i ￿ Small_fi - - .054
- - (.209)
Cred_shareb;i ￿ Small_fi - - -.144
- - (.163)
No. ￿rms 2,205 2,165 2,165
No. obs. 11,008 9,964 9,964
Note: Fixed e⁄ect (￿rm-level) estimation with data at the bank-￿rm level. Each column corre-
sponds to a regression. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of loans over the period September
2008-March 2009; regressors data refer to September 2008. Parameter estimates are reported with ro-
bust standard errors in brackets (cluster at individual ￿rm level). ￿Signi￿cant at the 10-percent level;
￿￿signi￿cant at the 5-percent level; ￿￿￿signi￿cant at the 1-percent level.
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